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Music Education as
Aesthetic Education:
A Critical Inquiry
By David].

Elliott

University of Toronto

~~lVl

usic education as aesthetic education" (or
MEAE) 'is one of the
most influential concepts in the history of
our field. For decades its principles have
been repeated, refined, and assumed in
countless publications.
For years its assumptions have been applied by curriculum
planners and classroom teachers. Accordingly, generations of music educators have
been reared on its beliefs.
The most extended expression of these beliefs is Bennett Reimer's A Philosophy ofMusic Education (1970) The range and depth
of Reimer's work has made MEAE an intellectual hub for inquiries differing widely in purpose, motivation, and method during the last
20 years. In short, A Philosophy ofMusic
Education (APME) is one of music
education's "classic" formulations.
Given the stature of MEAE and the complete
reaffirmation of its underlying beliefs in the
new edition of APME (1989), it may seem that
there is little to say at this point beyond noting
new variations on old themes. Not so.
The "new" version of MEAE provides an important opportunity to remind ourselves that
unexamined philosophical commitment is of
negative value where the health of a profession is concerned. Viewed as rational practices, music, education, and music education
are dynamic, evolving systems. In contrast,
philosophical commitment is often static.
Hence guidance therefrom is likely to become
obsolete eventually. A<; a matter of principle,
then, our commitment requires regular review.
David]. Elliott is Professor and Chair of Music Education at the Uniuersity of Toronto,
Ontario, Canada.
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If it can be further demonstrated that the
source of this commitment is logically flawed,
then the need for critical re-examination becomes even more immediate. Such is the
case, I believe, with the philosophy of music
education as aesthetic education.

Overview
In a previous review (Elliott, 1989a), I examined
several weakness in MEAE. Here I undertake a
more through philosophical analysis.
Indeed, it is important to emphasize that the
intent of this effort is nothing more or less than to
"do philosophy" on behalf of music education.
\Vhat "doing philosophy" includes is being "critical"-not in the vulgar sense of deliberately finding fault, but in the Greek sense of kritikos. being
a careful scrutinizer of reasons, concepts, and beliefs to separate light claims from wrong. In sum,
an uncritical philosopher is no philosopher at all.
What the MEAE philosophy has taken decades
to develop cannot be fully examined in one essay.
Accordingly, the focus here is MEAE'sphilosophical foundations. Consider, however, that since
J\lIEAE'spractical guidelines depend on these
foundations, the adequacy (or not) of the latter
directly implicates the former.
To anticipate, I suggest that despite moditications and additions, the central weaknesses of
MEAE are not only repeated but deepened in
APME (1989) Chief among these weaknesses are
the following:
1. MEAE depends on a cluster of blurred distinctions and oversimplified dichotomies that undermine
its logical integrity;
2. the basic premises of MEAE depend on a reductionist concept of "music;" and
3. at its core, MEAE is only a cogent explanation of
Susanne Langer's illogical theory of alt.

These weaknesses do not disqualify MEAE
completely. Nevertheless, they are sufficient
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in number and depth to aver that MEAEnot
Although MEAE's basic equation (music =
only fails to provide a plausible explanation of
fine art) may seem quite natural and
the nature and value of MUSIC, it fails to offer
unassailable at first, it is neither. The assumpa defensible account of the uniqueness and
tion that music is a "fine art" (or aesthetic) in
necessity of music in education. In short,
its nature and value is not only theory-laden, it
while its place in history is not in dispute,
is theory-generated. Accordingly, several phiMEAE's status as a philosophy certainly is.
losophers suggest that to embrace the "aesthetic" concept of music is to embrace a parThis article has two parts. Part One addresses
ticularly limited notion. Indeed, the aesthetic
the first and second weaknesses listed above.
Part Two addresses the first
concept of music rests on
the obsolete social and hisand third. More specifically,
Part Two attempts to explain
torical pronouncements of a
why MEAE's central claimdistant time and place (See
Philosophy is
that "music education is the
Berleant, 1986; Sparshott,
not a conveeducation of human feeling"
1982, 1987; Wolterstorff,
(Reimer, 1989,p. 53)-fails the
1980, 1987; Donougho,
nience store full
test of logical scrutiny.
1987; Subotnick, 1987;
of theories ~wait- Danto, 1986).
Part One
First of all, then, although
ing to be purThe fundamental premises
Reimer claims that "there
of MEAEstate that "the essenchased by rm.isic
exists at present an extial nature and value of music
tremely high level of agreeeducators shopeducation are determined by
ment about the nature of
the nature and value of the art
ping for the 'best
music ... among those
of music [italicsmine]" (Reimer,
who have given serious
possible point of
1989, p. 1).1 APME promises
thought to this matter" (p.
to explain the meaning of these
view.' Rather,
3), much serious thought in
premises through "reasoned,
the contemporary philosophilosophy is an
careful, systematic statements"
phy of music speaks against
(p. 2). At first glance, everyactive practice: it
this claim. To explain more
thing seems in order. Unfortufully, we must look careis the critical
nately, these premises blur
fully at what "aesthetics"
several important concepts and
exarrlination of
really means.
distinctions. Let me explain.
1.2 "Aesthetics," says
concepts, as1.1 Although the term "art"
Reimer, is "the branch of
saturates MEAE from beginsurnptioris and
philosophy concerned with
ning to end, Reimer does not
questions of the nature and
beliefs.
explain that what he actually
value of the arts" (p. 1).
means by "art" is not art, but
Furthermore, says Reimer,
"fine art." The distinction is
Aesthetics is the study of that
crucial. Why? Stated correctly,
about art which is the essence
of art ... so among all the disciplines of
MEAE's premises go as follows: The essential
thought that are interested in the arts, aesthetics
nature and value of music education are deis the one devoted to an explanation of their
termined by the nature and value of the fine
intrinsic nature. (p. 2)
art of music. This distinction highlights two
There are several reasons to question
key questions:
Reimer's notion of aesthetics. First, aesthetics
1. Who/What says that music is a priori a "fine
is not the (only) branch of philosophy conart"? and
cerned with the nature and value of music.
2. How does the equation music = "fine art"
Aesthetics (properly understood) offers only
restrict or expand our understanding of what
MUSIC is?
one particular viewpoint on the nature and
Section 1.3 below provides several answers.
value of music. Hence it is arbitrary to imFirst, however, a larger point must be made.
ply, as APME implies, that aesthetics is the

"

"
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definitive philosophical source on what is
essential about music's nature and value. In
fact, as I argue next, it may be the reverse.
l.3 Western philosophical thought about
art and beauty began with the Greeks. But it
was not until the eighteenth century that a
particular group of theorists including
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Baumgarten
founded "aesthetics" and, along with it, the
notion of art as "fine art."
"Aesthetics" was originally coined by a
young German philosopher, A. G.
Baumgarten (1735), to designate a field of
study that would accomplish for the emotional effectiveness of nondiscursive symbols
what logic accomplished for the symbols of
conventional reasoning. Most attempts to
formulate a systematic theory of "fine art"
based on aesthetic assumptions, including
Susanne Langer's theory of art, duplicate
Baumgarten's intent.
From a primary concern with poetic imagery, Baumgarten's sense of "aesthetics" grew
quickly to include the images of painting, the
general effectiveness of works of art and, finally, all natural things. Those who considered the beauty of art no different than the
beauty in nature deemed aesthetics the study
of beauty. Aesthetics is still commonly used
in this sense: namely, as "pertaining to sensory contemplation and its objects." Aesthetics then become entangled with the notion
that beauty was something accessible only to
those with taste. Like morality, taste was
considered an attribute that was innate yet
open to influence through education. In
short, as conceived by Baumgarten and
elaborated by Kant in his Third Critique, aesthetics was actually "an offshoot of attempts
to formulate a normative theory of taste; that
is, to vindicate the preferences of cultivated
persons" (Sparshott, 1987, p. 39).
Now prior to the emergence of aesthetics
in the eighteenth century there was no such
thing as the grouping we now call the "fine
arts." Of course, music, painting, poetry, and
so on were in place centuries before
Baumgarten's arrival, as was the term "art" in
the Greek sense of ars or tecbne something
done or made.s Missing until the eighteenth
century, however, was a conceptual basis for
uniting these otherwise disparate phenom50
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ena. Aesthetics provided the required concept. According to the "aesthetic concept,"
music, painting, and so on are not "useless;"
rather, they all have one particular use: They
are "objects" which exist primarily to be contemplated "aesthetically," i.e., in abstraction
from their contexts of use and production.
The formalization of the "aesthetic concept" was aided by the social practice of conceiving and using "music" (and so on) as a
collection of objects or "works" in this fine
art way: of "that use itself coming into
prominence among the cultural elite of the
eighteenth century" (Wolterstorff, 1980, p. 7).
Theoretical norms of contemplation were simultaneously and subsequently codified.
These norms included the overarching concept of "aesthetic experience" and its concomitants: intrinsicality, disinterestedness,
psychical distance, and so on. (Two hundred years later, MEAE continues to embrace
and promote these same aesthetic norms
wholly and uncritically [See Reimer, 1989,
pp. 102-104]) Those for whom the "fine arts"
were the center of concern made aesthetics
into the theory of alt.
Properly understood, then, aesthetics is not
a synonym for "the philosophy of art" or "the
philosophy of music," as aesthetic educators
believe. Rather, aesthetics is "that branch of
philosophy that is concerned with the analysis of concepts and the solution of problems
that arise when one contemplates aesthetic
objects" (Hospers, 1967, p. 35). Aesthetics is
not the theory of art; aesthetics is one particular body of theory. Moreover, aesthetic
theories are inherently narrow. How so? Because the aesthetic concept of music begins
and ends with the reductionist assumption
that music has only one nature and one purpose: "Music" is essentially a matter of autonomous objects or "works" that exist to be
contemplated in a uniform and narrow way,
i.e., aesthetically. It is precisely this set of
eighteenth-century axioms that underlies
MEAE (See Reimer, 1989, pp. 28, 99) and that
MEAE continues to perpetuate.
The question that arises next is this: Why
did the aesthetic concept and its accompanying norms emerge at this particular time?
Several writers, including Donougho (1987),
Geertz (983), Kristellar (1965), Elias (969),
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Berleant (1986), and Bourdieu (1972, 1984)
emphasize that aesthetics was indigenous to
the social context of eighteenth-century Europe. The nobility of the time were legitimized as such by their association with the
princely courts of the period, and, naturally,
by their preference for and support of courtapproved pursuits. Such pursuits included
the "beaux arts." Music was at the center of
this legitimation and sponsorship process.
Donougho (1987) comments on this "prestige
function" of fine art:
It served to mark off the nobility from the
crowd and to affiliatethem with the court.
Having lost the status attendant upon their military role, they [the nobility]received compensation in aesthetic coin. Becoming cultured rather
than learning how to use the rapier became the
primary duty of the gentleman, the" bonnete
bomme,"
And where the elite had used to participate in popular culture (festivals,carnivals,
and the like), they now began to withdraw and
establish a sense of "high" culture, excluding
the "low" (p, 342).
l.4 In view of the above, it seems reasonable to suggest that MEAE's definition of aesthetics is, at best, incomplete. What Reimer
defines as "the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and values of the
arts" (p. 1) is the philosophy of art, not aesthetics. Moreover, aesthetics and the philosophy of music are not synonymous, because not all philosophical thinking about
music embraces the assumptions underlying
the "aesthetic" concept of music. Indeed,
several contemporary philosophers emphasize that what some people (especially aesthetic educators) too often take as fact-that
music is aesthetic in nature and value-is not
a fact, nor is it born of fact, nor do all philosophies of music begin and end with the
norms promulgated by aesthetics. The aesthetic concept of music is merely one notion
of music rooted in eighteenth-century a
priori assumptions.
More to the point, the likelihood that the
main ingredients of this originating context
have already passed away and that the aesthetic axioms anchoring MEAE are now obsolete has been argued vigorously of late
(e.g., Sparshott, 1980; Berleant, 1986;
Wolterstorff, 1987). Berleant (1986), for example, argues that the old aesthetic axiomsaesthetic object, aesthetic qualities, and aesVolume II, Number 3
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thetic experience-are
"anachronistic . . . and
manifestly unsatisfactory" in accounting for
most examples of music, dance, painting,
and so on of the past century and even "misleading" when applied to examples from earlier periods (p, 104).
In sum, since one aspect of MUSIC no
doubt involves its status as a product, and
since aesthetics offers one important historical notion of the product dimension of music, it would not be unreasonable to suggest
that the "aesthetic concept" of music be
granted a limited place within a more comprehensive and realistic philosophy of music
education. But more than this, would be unreasonable since, as many philosophers now
hold, the central weakness of aesthetics is
that it fails to acquit MUSIC as a rich and
complex human phenomenon. The aesthetic
concept of music is unjustifiably essentialist:
It is on a hopeless quest for the singular essence of "art," something that we can catch
and repeat in one evocative phrase.
It follows from the above that APME's familiar distinctions among three alternative
theories of art-referentialism,
absolute formalism, and absolute expressionism (pp. 1429)-are distinctions without a difference.
How so? Because all three theories are aesthetic theories. They all begin and end with
the constricted notion that "music" Callmusic
everywhere) is a priori a collection of autonomous aesthetic objects.
Thus, in addition to being conceptually
and historically inaccurate, MEAE's equations-i.e., aesthetics = the philosophy of art
= the philosophy of music-give
music educators the false impression that there are no
philosophical alternatives to the aesthetic
view. As Alperson (1987) clearly demonstrates, however, there is a large body of
Western philosophical thinking about music
that originated with the Greeks and that
flourishes today unencumbered by the aesthetic concept. On these grounds, Sparshott
(1982) objects to the common confusion between aesthetics and the philosophy of a11
that MEAE perpetuates:
.. works of art are made before they are enjoyed. Not only does their status as things
made by people radically affect the way we
perceive them and think about them, but the
making itself is a human activitythat one would
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"The nobility of [eighteenth-century

Europe] were Iegitirnizecl as

such by their association with the princely courts of the period,
and ... Music was at the center of this Iegitimatiori and sponsorship process." -- David]. Elliott
expect to be more, rather than less, an expression of human intelligence than the appreciation of criticism of them. . . . But to
treat the philosophy of art as a division of
aesthetics casts doubt on the legitimacy of
this procedure (Sparshott, 1982, p. 16).
1.5 Sparshott's observation leads us to
other blurred distinctions in APME. First
among these is Reimer's claim that "the
words 'musical' and 'artistic' will often be
used to substitute for the word 'aesthetic' because they usually mean the same thing" (p.
xiii). Reimer's conflation of these terms is
mistaken. There is an important body of
philosophical discourse that speaks against
the suggestion that these terms "usually mean
the same thing." A simple example will emphasize the crucial distinction between "aesthetic" and "artistic."
Any phenomenon, natural or human-made,
can be examined in terms of its sensuous, formal, or "beautiful" qualities. A sunset, for example, can be looked at solely in terms of its
colors and so on. But the experience of a
painting of a sunset is a different matter altogether. Here we must be concerned not only
with the concrete aspects of the painted sunset, but with its artistic (as well as its many
other) aspects: e.g., the skill and knowledge
demonstrated in the production of the painting; the standards of artistry met or failed; the
way certain traditional problems, techniques,
and processes of painting were taken up, met,
or surpassed; the way the sunset is characterized by the artist, and so on. But in the case
of a natural sunset, artistic criteria do not apply
since a sunset has no link with a human artist.
In other words, what separates a painting of a
sunset from the "natural beauty" of a real sunset is the presence or absence of human
agency and artistry.
According to MEAE (pp. 104-106), however, it apparently matters little whether one
is looking at a natural country scene, or a
painting of a country scene, or listening to a

52
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piece of music. In all cases, the goal is to
achieve an "aesthetic experience" by perceiving and reacting to the "aesthetic components of a thing" (p. 107). Thus, says
Reimer, just as the "music educator (aesthetic
to the core)" looks at the natural valley scene
and "loses himself in the expressive qualities
presented to his vision" so that "his experience is aesthetic" (p. 105), the very same music educator moves next to a Mozart symphony and approaches it in the same way.
"He [sic] perceives those qualities which
make sound expressive-melody,
rhythm,
harmony, tone color, texture, form-and
their fusion in a work . . . His experience of
the music ... is aesthetic" (p. 106). Indeed,
his or her experience is aesthetic, but this
does not automatically mean that our busy
music educator's experience of the Mozart
symphony is artistic, let alone musical. To
be musical, one's experience and understanding of a Mozart symphony must go far
beyond aesthetic qualities.
Educationally speaking, then, whereas a
comprehensive philosophy of music or
painting would be equally concerned with a
wide range of considerations impacting on a
musical performance or a painting, an aesthetic philosophy like MEAE focuses almost
exclusively on aesthetic elements (Reimer's
brief references to "artistic/cultural influences" notwithstanding).
In fact, aesthetic
theories in general, and the aesthetic theories of Langer and Meyer in particular (upon
which the MEAE depends), have little to say
about artistic matters. Accordingly MEAE
has little to say about artistic matters. MEAE
conceives such aspects of MUSIC as craft,
skill, technique, artistry, expertise, and performance as "means behaviors" (p. 167) or
"technical-critical" considerations that have
no intrinsic values. Indeed, it is a major
weakness of MEAE that it makes no use of
important distinctions in the recent philosophicalliterature
of "artistry" (e.g., Howard,
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"Elliott's quote about ho~ the nobility in eighteenth-century
Europe used the 'prestige function' of fine art to mark themselves
off from the crovvd ...

is about as germane to contemporary

aesthetics ... as eighteenth-century

science is to contemporary

quantum physics." -- Bennett Reimer
1982; Best, 1982; Fethe, 1977; Rao, 1988).
In short, MEAE is an aesthetic philosophy
through and through, not an artistic philosophy. The point is worth emphasizing in
view of the implication arising from APME's
conflations that MEAE is more comprehensive than it really is. In fact, the MEAE notion provides minimal insight into many essential concepts related to music as an artistic endeavor in general, and to music and
music education as it concerns performance
in particular. Hence MEAE's curricular suggestions about performance as a "means" in
both general music and performance programs are weakly founded.
In sum, because MEAE's aesthetic axioms
exclude the vast majority of ways of conceptualizing and experiencing music, an aesthetic concept of music is, at best, an oversimplified concept. Indeed, MEAE's prior
assumption that the nature and the value of
music (instead of natures and values) can be
determined for all music everywhere is, in
itself, narrow and arbitrary. This last point
deserves a further word.
1.6 In contrast to the position taken in
APME, I suggest that "philosophy," properly
understood, is not concerned with saying what
is "necessary and unique" about phenomena
like music, or what music is "at bottom" (p.
85). Rather, philosophy seeks to say what music is all about when considered comprehensively. Furthermore, philosophy is not a convenience store full of theories waiting to be
purchased by music educators shopping for
"the best possible point of view" (pp. 14-15).
Rather, philosophy is an active practice: It is
the critical examination of concepts, assumptions, and beliefs. On this view, precise distinctions and comprehensiveness are the hallmarks of good philosophy.
MEAE's initial insistence that we should

nature and the value of music is, therefore, a
questionable philosophical strategy. In fact,
it contradicts APME's promise to provide music educators with "a probing analysis of the
nature of music" (p, 7). Moreover, consider
that APME's one-dimensional notion of philosophy may be partly to blame for its tendency to traffic in oversimplified dualisms
(e.g., reasoning versus feeling, science versus
art, making versus creating) as opposed to
undertaking careful conceptual analyses of
these key terms. More on this in a moment.
1.7 For the above reasons, I suggest that
an explanation of the natures and values of
music are not necessarily (or even likely) to
be found in an aesthetic concept of music as
MEAE maintains. Put differently, Reimer's
claim that "aesthetics is the study of that
about art which is the essence of art" (p. 2) is
comparable to claiming that (say) Puritanism
is the study of that about religion which is
the essence of religion.
Indeed, by relying on aesthetics for a
grounding concept of music, MEAE negates
the possibility of developing a philosophy of
music education based on an independent
philosophy of music as MUSIC. The objections of aesthetic educators notwithstanding,
it seems clear that MEAE's grounding "aesthetic concept" of music is static: It rests
squarely on the central axioms of eighteenthcentury "aesthetics" (Berleant, 1986).
Thus, when Reimer claims that "the position about art being taken in this book is,
essentially, a 'musical' one" (p. 119), it is actually the reverse. (In any case, what we
need and want is not a philosophical position on fine art, but a philosophical position
on MUSIC.) Properly understood, the position about music taken in MEAE is not a musical one but an aesthetic one. That is,
Susanne Langer's theory of fine art (MEAE's

confine ourselves to a search for the single

foundation) begins with the prior assumption
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that music = autonomous aesthetic objects (=
"perceptible forms" = "presentational symbols" and so on).
1.8 In view of the above, MEAE's contention that aesthetic appreciation is the most
appropriate way of approaching musical performances "is to promote a normative rather
than a descriptive paradigm of artistic response. It may be desirable to some, but
that is all" (Markowitz, 1983, p. 34).
Indeed, in reflecting on the logic and plausibility of MEAE'snotion of "musical experience," consider that aesthetics defines "musical" via a negative norm. That is, MEAEinsists
that listeners ought not to consider the sounds
that they listens to in equal relation to human
concerns outside the sounds themselves: social, historical, moral, political, religious, or
even musically "technical-critical." MEAE's
theoretical center of gravity lies inward: "Absolute Expression," says Reimer, "insists that
meaning and value are internal; they are functions of the artistic (i.e., the aesthetic) qualities
themselves and how they are organized."
Accordingly, MEAE insists that the listener
strive for a kind of "immaculate perception"
of so-called aesthetic qualities. Of course, as
we now realize, this asocial, ahistorical
amoral-in a word, this "a-human"-notion
of musical experience is in keeping with
Europe's eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
ethnocentric norms of appreciation.
In fairness, Reimer does tack on the qualification that "the artistic/cultural influences
surrounding a work of art may indeed be
strongly involved in the experience the work
gives, because they become part of the internal experience for those aware of these influences" (p, 27). As far as MEAE takes it, this
makes sense; unfortunately, MEAE doesn't
take it very far. It can't. MEAE's focus is
dominantly internal in all circumstances.
Moreover, MEAE does not provide a plausible explanation of how external influences
become internal, or how a listener can be
concerned with practical and social aspects
of music and, at the same time, "be removed
from practical, utilitarian concerns" (p. 103).
In sum, MEAE maintains that all music everywhere ought to be approached aesthetically by making "external" considerationseven artistic considerations of performance54
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subservient to internal "aesthetic qualities."
Thus we find, for example, that MEAE categorizes the "technical-critical" experience of
music as "nonmusical" because it is
"nonaesthetic" Cp. 120): i.e., because "in this
response the perception is of the technical
and peripheral elements which go into the
making of music" (p. 125). Following
Reimer's previous cont1ation (aesthetic = artistic), such matters are therefore also
nonartistic. Note also that matters of audience size, intonation, and style are listed together under "technical-critical" as if they all
had equal status in the process of musicmaking Cp. 125).
More importantly, MEAE seems wrong to
suggest that the control and deployment of
technical elements of a performance are a
priori "mechanical" elements. Excellent performances pivot on how they are achieved,
and how they are achieved involves "technique" as part of artistry and musicianship in
a far more rich and complex sense than
MEAE ever takes up in its limited references
to "craftsmanship." Surely the matters of a
pianist's style and a violinist's vibrato are not
simply "technical-critical" and not at all
"nonmusical" as MEAE declares (p. 120).
Before leaving the point about "outside"
musical matters, consider that Kivy (1984) is
only one among several contemporary philosophers who has provided rich and detailed explanations of the so-called
"extrarnusical significance" of representational music. Such analyses provide strong
reasons to question MEAE's narrow view that
referential musical experiences are a priori
nonmusical because they are "nonaesthetic"
Cp.120). In fact, one of the several ways in
which music performs its several cognitive
functions is the way in which some works
act as predicates to various "subjects"
(people, events, places). That is, passages of
music can and do function as musical "predicates" to characterize "subjects" indicated by
titles and programs. Such pieces and passages "characterize" by means of the equal
interplay between musical patterns and contextual cues that we understand verbally and
nonverbally, not by reference to a dictionary
of one sort or another, but by knowledge
and cultural conventions.
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Overall, MEAE directs the listener to homogenize the diversity of practices and purposes that musical performances and compositions can and do involve by: (1) imputing a
single purpose to all of them; (2) imposing a
single mode of response on all their listeners;
and (3) attributing a single motivation to all
artists. Furthermore, MEAE holds that the
music of all cultures must be approached in
the same way, i.e., aesthetically (p.145). This
seems to defy logic, cultural reality, and the
basic ideals of multicultural education, as I
argue elsewhere (Elliott, 1990)
In plain English, MEAE's insistence that all
instances of "music" everywhere ought to be
approached aesthetically, listened to aesthetically, and taught aesthetically is analogous to a sports law stating that all instances
of "football" ought to be approached, appreciated, and taught as soccer. MEAE's insistence will only impress those who are already convinced.
In fact, what is the basis for MEAE's edict
that if a person does not follow the aesthetic
rules of engagement, then a person's experience is "nonmusical"? The basis cannot be
past or present human practice. The Greeks
had music but no concept of "the aesthetic
point of view," and many forms and practices
of contemporary music and world musics
militate against such norms. The same is
true of many other musics in many other periods of musical history. In fact, the imposition of a uniform method and standard of
aesthetic perception in relation to all music
listening seems to be the antithesis of what is
most observable about the practice, the production and the experience of music: its diversity, non uniformity, and ambiguity-even
with respect to its perception.
1.9 To conclude this brief examination of
aesthetics, consider that the essence of music
conceived aesthetically lies in a set of predetermined norms that dictate an idiosyncratic
concept of what music is. The link between
music and aesthetics (properly understood) is
therefore not a natural link; it is a purely
theoretical link based on the institutionalization of a specific social/historical doctrine of
production, attention, appreciation, evaluation, and interpretation.
The weight of modern scholarship in the
Volume 11, Number
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philosophy of music, the philosophy of art,
the history of musical practice, and
ethnomusicology presents a major challenge
to the "aesthetic concept" of music that anchors MEAE: "the assumption that music is
necessarily art in the fine art sense is
ahistorical and arbitrary" (Donougho, 1987,
p. 24). Put differently, the aesthetic axioms
that anchor.MEAE relate to the contemporary
philosophy of music as IQ relates to the contemporary psychology of intelligence. Accordingly, MEAE's aesthetic concept of music
could no more ground (say) Wolterstorff's
multifaceted reflections on music than the IQ
concept could ground Howard Gardner's
theory of multiple intelligences.
1.10 As a coda to this part of the discussion, and as a prelude to the next, let us now
examine a concept that is given a prominent
place in the new version of MEAE: namely,
Reimer's concept of "a concept." Reimer
wants to say that music is "nonconceptual in
essence," but this cannot be held. Musical
cognition is conceptual in both the traditional
sense (which Reimer underestimates) and in
the much more contemporary senses of the
term which Reimer overlooks. Moreover,
MEAE's fabricated dichotomy, music (= nonconceptual) versus the basics (= conceptual),
is not only unsupportable, it shoots music
educators in the foot. Let me explain.
Based on what he believes are "two excellent definitions of a concept" (taken from
Gowin, 1970 and Kaelin, 1970), Reimer
makes three untenable claims (pp. 80-81).
First, says Reimer, "what is needed for a concept to exist ... is something that is manifested more than once. A singular instance
of something cannot be a concept" (p. 81).
The second thing needed for a concept, says
Reimer, "is some sort of sign or symbol, or
name, or indicator of the common feature
being noticed" (p. 81) Third, a concept has
to do with "how well a person associates a
particular symbol or name with the phenomenon to which it refers" (p. 83). Let us take
each of these claims in turn.
First, although it has long been assumed that
a singular instance of something cannot be a
concept, substantive evidence from cognitive
science leaves little doubt now that a concept
can be represented by what cognitive scien55
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"More directly, Reirrier's 'nonconceptual'

notion of rm.isic shoots

rrrusic education in the foot: It not only represents the nature of
rrursic cognition to both our allies and our opponents, it flags the
baseless notion that rrrusic cognition is devoid of 'thinking' as this
terrn has traditionally been understood." -- David]. Elliott
tists call "an exemplar": that is, one specific
instance of a concept or a subset of a concept
(See Smith, 1988; Kemler-Nelson 1984; Brooks,
1978; Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Medin &
Smith, 1981; Nosof'iky,1986; Estes, 1986). In
fact, not only are exemplar-based concepts
highly adaptive, but children "generally learn
artificial categories by nonanalytic exemplar
strategy" (Smith, 1988, p. 43),
Second, it is not a necessary condition of
"a concept" that a phenomenon be paired
with a symbol of any kind, nor is it the case
that when no words or other symbols are
present "the experience is nonconceptual" as
Reimer maintains (p. 81). Again, many lines
of evidence now indicate that conceptualization can proceed in words, or actions, or
abstract and concrete imagery.
Since Reimer brings up the subject of action,
recall what Gilbert Ryle (1949) pointed out
years ago in his well-known book, T7JeConcept of Mind: namely, that intentional actions
are conceptual through-and-through. With this
in mind, consider the following passage from
APME: "No words or any other symbols need
be present as you ... take the walk, and so
long as no such vehicles are present, the experience is nonconceptual" (pp. 81-82).
Reimer trips the old Cartesian trap by suggesting that intentional physical action is not
conceptual. Not surprisingly, then, MEAE is
unable to provide an adequate explanation
of musical cognition as it manifests in musical performance.
Returning now to the main point of this
section, consider that our contemporary understanding of "a concept" goes far beyond
the old "classical" formulation which MEAE
adopts to contrast (falsely) with its
"nonconceptual" notion of music. Cognitive
science now recognizes various types of concepts (Smith, 1988; Nelson, 1985);
"conceptualization" is no longer uniformly
conceived in the one-dimensional terms held
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by Reimer's chosen sources. Rather, a concept is a cognitive unit that can be manipulated as though it were a mental object
(Nelson, 1985, p. 72), or embodied in action.
Indeed, people regularly conceive problems
and their solutions in nonverbal modes (now
considered instances of conceptualization):
i.e., various forms of concrete and abstract representation (See Glucksberg, 1988; Shepard &
Metzler, 1971; Miller, 1972; Kosslyn, 1983; and
Potter et. al., 1986). Moreover, even brief reference to Tbe Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(1967) and/or T7JeEncyclopedia qf Psychology
(1984) reveals that the modern understanding
of "having a concept" is not limited to knowing the meaning of a word or associating a
symbol with a phenomenon. Instead, "having
a concept" and "conceptualizing" includes a
wide range of cognitive processes. For example, a musician may have a clear,
nonverbal, aural concept of "tone quality"
which s/he mentally manipulates or conceptualizes while composing, arranging, or performing music.
Hence, Reimer is incorrect when he claims
that "In all cases ... a concept is a mechanism by which one can refer to a noticed
phenomenon" (p.83). Furthermore, in having a concept of something like "tone quality" (i.e., holding an aural image in my
mind), I also have "knowledge of this phenomenon. And although there are many
phenomena I cannot put into words (e.g.,
the precise quality of a clarinet's tone), I can
still conceive them and think with them as
mental representations. "Clarinet tone" is not
merely a perceptual construct, as MEAE's
oversimplified dichotomy of percepts and
concepts leads us to think. Each "clarinet
tone," (melody, and so on) is a specific auditory event that we pick out of the acoustic
wave and categorize as such by means of a
myriad of contextually sensitive cognitive
processes. Thus it does not seem to be the
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"I find it incomprehensible
ing musical experience

that [Elliott]criticizes me for not regard-

as cognitive, -w-henthat is precisely the

point I argue . . . " -- Bennett Reimer
case that concepts only provide "knowledge
about" and "never yield knowledge of" as
Reimer maintains (p. 83).
In sum, although MEAE (p. 81) is correct
in saying that no words are necessary while
listening to Beethoven's music, conceptualizing in all sorts of ways (conventional and
unconventional) is necessary in varying
proportions according to the kind of music
being cognized, the description under
which it is being cognized, and the context
in which it is being presented and out of
which it originated.
Kivy (1990) emphasizes, in fact, that all
music listening experiences are conceptladen (in the traditional and nontraditional
sense). Moreover, says Kivy, it is a serious
underestimation of our cognitive capacities to
suppose that thinking about music while listening to music compromises our enjoyment
or affective experience of the music, as
Reimer suggests (p.109). Although academics separate such cognitive aspects out for
discussion, in reality they occur coincidentally and in much more complex ways than
we can possibly describe in simple dichotomies (e.g, thinking about versus thinking
with). We hear "music" in terms of various
descriptions which we can (and often do)
think about and with at the same time.
Even in the case of so-called "pure" instrumental music, the sounds are never "alone"
in the strict sense of being "intrinsically"
meaningful. The meaning and/or enjoyment
of musical experiences is neither direct nor
immediate as MEAE claims (p. 91). On the
contrary, it is heavily mediated by knowledge
and experience: by what has been traditionally understood as conceptualization, and by
what has more recently been understood.
Overall, then, the absence of internal
speech while listening to music or making
music does not mean that such experiences
are nonconceptual as Reimer claims, only
nonverbal. As Glucksberg phrases it, what
matters is the way in which the mind "speaks
Volume II, Number 3
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while thinking, not the tongue" (Glucksberg,
1988, p. 239). Reimer errs by conflating the
two. In short, and as Smith (1988, p. 21)
makes clear, the classical view of a "concept"
put forth by Gowin and Kaelin (and adopted
by Reimer) "has been seriously undermined
by the collective work of linguists, philosophers, and psychologists" since the 1970s
(see Schwartz, 1979; Fodor, et al, 1980; and
Smith and Medin, 1981). Accordingly,
Reimer's alleged dichotomy between "conceptualization" and "aesthetic perceptual
structuring" cannot be held. Moreover, this
"new" contrast is just Langer's discursive-presentational dichotomy in new jargon.
To end this section of the discussion, note
that although MEAE puts great faith in
Howard Gardner's overview of cognitive science (p. 85), Gardner's survey does not stand
up as a reliable source on the nature of auditory cognition. Hence, to use Reimer's own
words, perhaps we ought to be "very cautious in making claims that cannot be substantiated," (in which category I include
Gardner's very general claims about the inherent separateness of language and music
processing). How so? In contrast to the
Reimer/Gardner reflections on musical cognition versus language cognition, recent studies
in auditory cognition indicate that music and
speech cognition share many commonalities
not previously understood.
1.11 Following from the above, but now on
the larger view, MEAE's basic notion of "the
musical experience" relies too heavily on
vague, Romantic notions that take no account
of the research literature in music cognition
which has burgeoned since the first edition of
APME. Indeed, one cannot help but wonder
why any philosophy (let alone music education's only philosophy), so concerned as it is
(and ought to be) with issues of perception,
affect, consciousness, cognition, mind (and so
on), should so consistently overlook conternporary research in cognition generally and music cognition particularly,
57
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More specifically, how can MEAE maintain
such a stark contrast between thinking and
feeling? For as the recent literature on affect
makes clear, cognition and affect overlap like
themes in a fugue; their complex interconnections are not nearly so black-and-white
as
MEAE's dualisms make it appear (See Elliott,
1987). More accurately, there seems to be
no such thing as thinking without feeling, or
feeling without thinking (including reasoning). Thus there are no good reasons to
claim, as MEAE claims, that "reading and
writing" are devoid of affective involvement.
or can it be held that reasoning, logic, rationality-in
a word thinking (See p. 80), as this
term has traditionally been used-is
absent
from music-making and music listening. In
fact, the richness of musical cognition inheres
in it being conceptual in a wide array of
senses. MEAE's central claim that music
(along with each of the other so-called "fine
arts") has a special corner on feeling, and
reading and writing on thinking, is an oversimplification (to say the least).
1.12 In view of the above, and as Vernon
Howard 0982; 1990) makes clear, "music"especially music performance-necessarily
depends on many varieties of thinking ranging on a continuum from traditional forms of
propositional thinking to nonverbal forms of
procedural thinking (see Elliott & Rao, 1990).
Thus, when Reimer states that music is
"nonconceptual
in essence" we must consider the possibility that his philosophy offers
a misleading view of the nature and value of
music and music cognition and, therefore, of
the nature and value of music education.
More directly, Reimer's "nonconceptual"
notion of music shoots music education in
the foot: It not only misrepresents the nature
of music cognition to both our allies and our
opponents, it flags the baseless notion that
music cognition is devoid of "thinking" as
this term has traditionally been understood.
More accurately, music cognition (as it applies in both music-making and music listening) is concept -laden in the richest sense of
the term.
In sum, although MEAE wants to tell us that
music is "cognitive" (which it most certainly
is), MEAE fails to provide a substantive explanation. Instead, it posits an oversimplified and
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untenable dichotomy: music = non conceptual
versus "the basics" = conceptual.
Viewed broadly, we must consider the possibility that MEAE's penchant for simple dichotomies (e.g., "writing and reading educates reasoning," whereas "creating art and
experiencing art educates feeling," pp. 32-33)
may actually place music educators in a
defenseless position. For in response to
similarly unsupportable
characterizations
of
the nature and value of the sciences versus
the arts (e.g., science = reasoning versus music = feeling), Vernon Howard (988) sounds
a warning:
Such a simplistic and misleading scheme alienates even as it misrepresents, leaving us confused as to what art and science are, what they
do as symbolic constructions, what the complex
relationships among them are, and what it takes
to do them well (p. 18).

Let us now turn to a detailed examination of
MEAE's central claim: the claim that music
education is the education of feeling (p. 53).

Part Two
The philosophy of MEAE is intended to explain the idea that "music and the other arts
are a basic way that humans know about
themselves and their world; that they are a basic mode of cognition" (p. 11). In fact, as
Reimer credits (e.g., pp. 45, 50, 63, 102, 119),
this idea and its supporting theory are original
to Susanne Langer. Hence MEAE's philosophy
is essentially an explanation of Langer's theory
of art, which holds that "works" of fine art are
a special kind of symbol.
2.1 To Langer (and therefore to Reimer, pp.
29-37), neither the variety of the external world
nor the constant flux of our feelings is knowable unless somehow ordered or stabilized.
The way humans make their experiences intelligible to themselves and to others is to impose
symbolic forms and patterns on their experiences. Symbols are more intelligible than the
things they stand for (events, feelings) because
symbols are stable and orderly.
On this view, languages (reading and writing) are one way we order our experiences.
But to Langer, works of art also provide ordered patterns that are analogous to important aspects of our lives. Therefore, says
Reimer, "creating art, and experiencing art,
do precisely and exactly for feeling what
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writing and reading do for reasoning" (p. 33).
The ordered patterns of works of art (nondiscursive symbols, or expressive forms) are
more understandable
than the "raw experience" of feeling because they are focused,
objective, and orderly, whereas feelings are
not. Langer (1953) therefore defines art as
"the creation of forms symbolic of human
feeling" (p. 40). On this view, music is a
"device to hold onto feeling ....a means to
give it permanent embodiment" (Reimer, p.
33). Thus, Langer (958) concludes, if "the
arts objectify subjective reality," then "art
education is the education of feeling" (p. 8).
Reimer refashions Langer's thesis as the
grounding concept of "music education as
aesthetic education":
The major function of art is to make objective
and therefore accessible [or "conceivable"
(Reimer, 1970, p. 39)] the subjective realm of
human responsiveness.
Art does this by capturing and presenting in its intrinsic [or "aesthetic,"
ibid.] qualities the patterns and forms of human
feeling. The major function of education in the
arts is [0 help people gain access to the experiences of feeling contained in the artistic [i.e.,
"aesthetic" ibid.] qualities of things. Education
in the arts, then, can be regarded as the education of feeling (p 53).

Anchoring Reimer's (i.e., Langer's) philosophy, then, is the following dualism: discursive forms provide information (knowledge
about) whereas nondiscursive forms provide
insight into feeling (knowledge of). Music,
on this view, is a special kind of symbol: a
presentational form (p. 86ft').
2.2 Langer and Reimer want to claim that
music is a presentational form that is "isomorphic with the patterns of felt life" (p. 102).
This claim depends upon the further claim that
the necessary and sufficient condition for one
thing to symbolize another is that both things
share a similar structure or have the same
"logical form." That is, Langer's theory maintains that the "pairing" process we perform
when we understand that something represents something else symbolically requires us
to make a logical relationship in our minds
between the two members of the pair. Such
pairing requires us to make an analogy between the structures of the two items in the
paired relationship.
Unfortunately, this pivotal claim cannot be
defended.
It is not necessary that two things
Volume 11, Number 3
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share a similar structure in order for a symbolic pairing to exist. Ernest Nagel (943)
made this point decades ago in a classic critique of Langer's theory. Nagel (p. 324) observed that if we take y = sin x as an example of a symbol, we realize that it stands
for a specific type of curve, the pattern of
which has no analogous relationship to its
symbol at all.
agel feather points out that a
map only succeeds in re-presenting a geographical area to the extent that an interpreter understands from the outset that a flat
piece of a paper with such-and-such marks
means such-and-such.
In other words, a
map is not a priori presentational.
Its meaning depends on prior discursive explanation.
From this standpoint, it does not have an
analogous structure to that which it represents. Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent us from giving someone a "picture" of a
geographical area by describing it in words
that specify landmarks, distances, geographical relationships, and so on. Again, such verbal descriptions have no analogous relationship to that which they symbolize.
Nagel's criticisms are enough to dissolve the
foundations of Reimer's dualistic view of symbols. For if things do not need to share the
same logical form to be paired ill a symbolobject relationship, then the basis for the
unique importance Langer and Reimer claim
for presentational f01111Sdisappears and, along
with it, the claim that there is a natural disparity between what discursive and presentational
fOI111scan symbolize. But even if Langer was
correct on this point, there are two further objections to her grounding dualism (which includes the claim that discursive form is fundamentally incapable of presenting the forms that
our feelings take). Before explaining these
two objections, however, there is an odd contradiction in MEAE that begs for attention now:
namely, Reimer's curious claim that music
does and, at the same time, does not arouse
feeling. Let me explain.
2.3 A vital tenet of Langer's theory is that
music does not arouse feeling in a listener;
music does not provide listeners with an experience of actual feeling. On the contrary,
Langer (1942) believes that:
if it [music] has emotional

content,

it "has" it

in the same sense that language "has" its

COI1-
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"Is it not the case that people often find musical performances
valuable for themselves?" -- David]. Elliott
ceptual content-symbolically
.... Music is not
the cause or the cure of feelings, but their
logical expression (p. 218).

Thus, says Langer emphatically (942),
"what music can actually reflect is only the
morphology of feeling [italics mine]" p. 238).
Musical patterns represent the general forms
that various feelings take and that various
feelings can share. In other words, musical
patterns have an open or unconsummated
link with the forms of feeling (Langer, 1942,
p. 240). Reimer quotes and rephrases
Langer's point on several occasions (e.g., pp.
50, 52, 88-90, 131).
At the same time, however, Reimer also
claims that music presents conditions which
"arouse feelings" Cp. 50). In fact, Reimer
goes further: He claims that "the explanation
of musical experience given here (i.e.,
Reimer's explanation of Langer's theory) implies another theory of how sound can be
used to give rise to feelings" (p. 130). In the
very next paragraph, Reimer quotes a key
passage from Langer which emphasizes the
opposite: "The tonal structures we call 'music' bear a close logical similarity to the forms
of human feeling" (Langer, 1953, p. 27, cited
in Reimer, p. 131). Immediately following
this quotation, Reimer reverses himself again
by referring his readers to Leonard B.
Meyer's theory (956) for an explanation of
how music arouses feeling. Unfortunately,
Meyer's arousal theory has also been systematically discounted in a number of analyses
(e.g., Budd, 1985; Kivy, 1990).
So, whereas Meyer's theory is an arousal
theory of the music-affect relationship,
Langer's is not. Contrary to Reimer's belief,
then, Langer's theory does not imply a theory
of how music arouses feeling; in fact, her
theory explicitly denies that music arouses
feeling. Why? Because for Langer to suggest
otherwise would be to dissolve the basis for
her claim that music provides us with insight
into feeling by symbolizing its dynamic forms
(not by arousing its actual content).
So Casks the reader), does music arouse
feeling, or not? Do we believe Reimer when
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he says that music captures and presents "the
patterns and forms of human feeling" (p, 53),
or do we believe him when he says that music produces subjective responses (p, 130)
and arouses feeling Cpo50)? The question
seems rather important given MEAE's central
concern with feeling and the "education" of
feeling. MEAE offers no answer; instead, it
simply knots two opposing (and equally untenable) theories together.
(The reader will please note at this point
that I am not suggesting that music and affect
are unconnected; not at all. I am only arguing
that the MEAE philosophy fails to provide a
plausible explanation of the music-affect relationship on which to rest its central claims).
2.4
ow, the first of our two objections to
MEAE's grounding dualism (see section 2.1
above) concerns the fact that it is not the
forms of our feelings that we usually have
the most difficulty capturing in words (See
Budd, 1985), Instead, it is the specific content of feeling that we have difficulty putting
into words. However, this difficulty is likely
not due to some natural incapability of discursive forms to render feeling. Rather, it
may be a result of the fact that: (a) what we
feel is unformed, or only in the process of
forming, when we attempt to put our feelings into words; and/or (b) that we simply
are not adept at using the expressive possibilities that language affords to capture the
forms and/or content of our feelings.
Second, language does have a powerful
capacity to engage our feelings beyond its
special use in poetry or drama, as any reader
of good prose will confirm, and as any witness to a skilled speaker, storyteller, or comedian will attest. Langer and Reimer attempt to support the opposite view by providing a reductive account of the affective
capacity of language. Of course, if one rest.ricts oneself to simple words and phrases to
represent what one feels, or if one completely overlooks the power of human utterance and inflection (or argument, or logic) to
move people with words, one can make it
seem that discursive form is somehow inad-
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"The arts always have been and rerriairi a source of a special, satisfying way for Iiurriaris to experience." -- Bennett Reirner
equate in this regard. But of course, language offers so much more. In short,
Reimer's (i.e., Langer's) reductive view of
language is not a satisfactory basis on which
to rest the contention that words are naturally incapable of moving us, or that "reading
and writing" are devoid of affect.
2.5 Next, MEAE's claim that the significance of music is a result of an "isomorphic"
relationship between the patterns of music
and the forms of human feeling is open to
several obvious objections.
First, as Langer admits, (and as Reimer accepts implicitly, pp. 45-50; 101-102), different
feelings may share the same forms. To
Reimer and Langer, then, feelings are not distinguished by the forms they take (e.g., patterns of growth and decay, tension and resolution, flowing and stowing, etc.). Accordingly, the best we can obtain from music is
not an understanding of actual feeling, but
only insight into the general forms of feelings. I3ut what could the value of such a
general awareness be? Indeed, generality
(says Reimer) is the precise characteristic of
discursive form that makes it inadequate as a
means of understanding feeling.
Second, if the affective states of depression
and joyfulness, for example, can both share
the same form, then the unique value that
MEAE attributes to music is dissolved. How
so? I3ecause if entirely different feelings are
not distinguished by their forms, then these
forms of development must not be limited to
music or to feeling. In other words, there is
nothing to distinguish the forms of feeling as
Langer and Reimer Cpp. 100-102) describe
them from the forms of an indefinite number
of natural and artifical patterns that permeate
human existence: e.g., the ebb and flow of
tidal seas, the expansion and contraction of a
rubber band, the breathing pattern of a kangaroo, or as Reimer suggests, "the gathering
storm, its energy, its dissolution" (p. 101).
At best, then, MEAE's concept of the significance of music sums to this: what music
can do is little more than to re-present the
general forms of an infinite number of indisVolume 11, Number 3
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tinguishable natural and artificial processes
which are already available for our contemplation in any number of objective forms. It
turns out, then, that not only are presentational forms "quite powerless to give precise
knowledge about the factual world" (p. 87),
they do not give us precise knowledge of
subjectivity, only "a sense of" the "dynamic
form of feeling" (p. 92). Harold Osborne
(984) is quite direct in his assessment of
these weaknesses in Langer's theory:
Whatever else we may say about them, works
of art are essentially individual and uniquely
created constructions, to be apprehended
each for what it is, not rudimentary concepts
or generalized statements about feeling or
anything else Cp. 87).

In the third place, then, we must question
whether the value that MEAE attributes to
music provides a convincing explanation of
why music is necessary. For what could be
the value of music's very general relationship
with forms of feeling (and the forms of many
other things)? Why would anyone want such
general "knowledge of' the forms of feeling?
And why would people value music over
any number of other vehicles that can objectify the "morphology of feelings"? Could access to such patterns be the primary reason
why people seek to make music and listen to
music? If so, then how can Reimer claim simultaneously that (a) discursive forms are
not capable of capturing the forms of feeling
because they deal in generalities (p. 86) and
(b) that "presentational forms" are capable of
capturing human feeling because they represent the general forms of feelings, and of
storms, and of the breathing of kangaroos?
2.6 More fundamentally, there is a crucial
contradiction in MEAE's premise that music is
a nonreferential, presentational symbol. Why?
On one hand, Reimer (p. 92) and Langer
(1957) insist that music is self-referential:
The art symbol ... is the expressive form. It is
not a symbol in the full familiar sense. for it does
not convey something beyond itself (p. 139).

On the other hand, however, Reimer and
Langer hold that music is significant precisely
because it expresses something beyond itself:
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It is a metaphor or an analog, "a tonal analogue of emotive life" (Langer, 1953, p. 27;
Reimer, pp. 52, 131).
This contradiction raises two major problems
for the philosophy of MEAE. First, Reimer's
grounding notion of music is hopelessly ambiguous on an essential question: Is music selfreferential or not? The question is important
because the efficacy of Reimer's philosophy
pivots to some considerable extent on his
"straw man" tactic of discrediting referentialism.
In fact, although Reimer tries to have his
cake and eat it too, logic will not allow it.
For if (a) the locus of music's significance
("knowledge of' the forms of feeling) and (b)
the means of providing this "knowledge of"
(musical patterns) are parallel, then (a) and
(b) are logically separate. In other words,
MEAE is not an absolutist theory as Reimer
claims, it is a referential theory. What MEAE
is really claiming is that the significance of
music lies outside the sounds themselves:
i.e., in our own personal awareness that we
have (somehow) grasped something about
how feelings go.
Indeed, consider that what the MEAE explanation really amounts to, as Kivy (990)
argues, is a fancy variation on referential accounts of musical meaning. That is, instead
of a conventional program or narrative, Absolute Expression substitutes a "deep'· or hidden narrative (Reimer following Langer following Schopenhauer?) concerning the
progress and development of feeling. Quite
conveniently, of course, the meaning of this
special narrative is "ineffable."
Second, if music captures not actual feeling
but an "analogue of emotive life," then as Thomas Clifton (983) rightly observes: "Langer
seems to have introduced into her argument a
strangely circular syllogism" Cpo43):
An is a symbol of human feeling.
We experience symbolized expressions of feeling in works of art. Therefore, art is the symbol
of a symbol (pp, 43-44).

2.6 Apart from these logical flaws, common sense is enough to raise doubt about
MEAE's basic notion that music is symbolic in
some strange sense of this term. For even if
we defy logic and admit that there may be a
type of symbol that can be both referential
and non-referential simultaneously, this
would still require us to accept another un62
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likelihood. That is, it seems implausible to
suggest that whenever we encounter the isomorphic relationship of music and feeling we
experience music "immediately" (pp. 91-92)
as a means to an end: that we understand
immediately that an "analog of feeling" is the
object of our cognition and that music is its
vehicle to cognition because, following
Langer (942), we find "the latter more easily
available than the former" (p, 58) or, following Reimer, because "we can examine the
object that captures the feeling" (p. 35).
In fact, is it not the opposite? Is it not the
case that people often find musical performances valuable for themselves? If so, then
we must at least question the primacy of the
function that Langer and Reimer assign to
music: that listeners seek out music to get
"knowledge of" a composer's "understanding
about the nature of feeling" (p. 66). Even if
we admit this possibility, we could not say
that it is either a necessary or a sufficient requirement for the enjoyment of understanding of music that we listen to it as a presentational form in order to gain something more
interesting than the sounds themselves; i.e., a
feeling of having grasped the forms of feeling. For these reasons, it is difficult to argue
with Malcolm Budd's conclusion (1985) that
"it is not in general true for the listener that
music is any kind of symbol" (p. 116).
2.8 On the other hand, perhaps Langer
and Reimer really do make a case for the
idea that music provides a specific understanding of music in virtue of their idea that
music is an unconsummated symbol: that
music imposes orderly forms on what we already feel, or that it imposes new patterns
for our feelings to take. In either case, according to Langer and Reimer, a listener "fills
in" the forms of the unconsummated symbol
(the music) with many possible ways of feeling "depending on who is experiencing it
and what that person brings to the experience at that particular moment" (p. 88).
But like the empty 'forms in a coloring
book, one could easily spend one's entire life
filling in the given forms with a few basic
colors. In other words, if one does not feel
deeply or broadly before perceiving and responding to the "open" forms of feeling, and
if one can not "know of' these feelings with-
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out the forms that music allegedly imposes
on one's feelings, it is difficult to see how
imposing such forms could amount to any
"knowledge of" feeling. Furthermore, it does
not seem plausible that a listener's lack of
experience with feeling could be improved
merely by offering new forms for his or her
amorphous feelings to take.
2.9 Beyond the weaknesses already noted,
there are four more arguments against the
significance that MEAE claims for music.
First, how can it be said that music "educates" if neither the forms that our feelings
take, nor any insight we gain into these
forms, is intelligible outside music listening
experiences?
According to MEAE, our minds
cannot hold the forms of feeling in consciousness. They slip the grasp of our cognition; feelings are elusive: "they disappear
into thin air," says Reimer, so that before a
feeling can "wash away," we need to "make
it into an object so that it stays as it is" Cp.
35). [either the analogous forms of music
that capture the forms of feeling, nor any intuitive recognition-nor
any "flash of understanding"-'·none
[of these) is permanent beyond the sound that passes" (Langer, 1942, p.
244). On this view, whatever we sense
about the nature of human feeling is only
available to our minds during the "immediate
experience" of works of art (Reimer, p. 92); it
cannot be known or retained outside of the
experience of music. On this view, to claim
the listener has achieved" knowledge of" feeling, that listener would have to be permanently engaged in listening to music. The
Langer/Reimer notion of "knowledge of feeling"-"knowledge"
that evaporates in the absence of musical form-is
peculiar at best; at
worst, it defies logic and common sense.
Second, as Sparshott (1963) and Lemmon
(975) point out, to posit that musical patterns and the forms of feeling are "isomorphic" requires that these two phenomena be
separately identifiable in the first place, "that
is, that they can be known independently
of
each other and brought together for an investigation of similarities or dissimilarities"
(Lemmon, p. 43-44). But this is precisely
what MEAE denies: "The major function of
art is to make objective and therefore accessible the subjective realm of human res ponVolume II, Number 3
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siveness" (Reimer, p. 53), To Reimer and
Langer, then, music and feeling are synonymous. Aside from the logical weakness of
this notion, it creates another problem. For if
the forms of feeling can only be accessed
when feeling is objectified in music, how can
we judge whether or not a piece of music is
"sensitive," i.e., whether or not it has succeeded in capturing "the depth and quality of
feeling" (p.136)? How can we compare
something with itself? Reimer tries to compensate for this problem by positing other
criteria for judgement.
But because the majority of these criteria (e.g., imagination, sensitivity, and authenticity) involve dimensions
of experience wherein means-ends distinctions are not relevant (see Sparshott, 1986)
they fail to provide adequate bases for determining musical excellence.
The larger problem with MEAE's criteria of
judgement, of course, is that they rest on a
concept of "creativity" that is obsolete in
terms of contemporary philosophical and
psychological research, as I explain elsewhere (Elliott, 1989). Hence many of MEAE's
assumptions and pronouncements
on the
"creativity" of performing, composing and
listening are not only questionable, but potentially damaging to music education.
Third, if MEAE is correct that our cognition cannot retain (a) the elusive forms of
feeling, or (b) the analogous forms of feeling embodied in music, or (c) a logical intuition about the forms of feeling, then
MEAE's claim that the primary function of
music is "cognitive" rests on an equally peculiar sense of "cognitive." Indeed, in addition to what has already been said about the
inadequacies
of this philosophy's notion of
"a concept," MEAE seems in conflict with
itself on an important point: namely, how
we get this curious "cognitive" payoff from
music. Consider the following.
On one hand MEAE insists we adhere to a
specific way of listening to music to receive
what it offers. That is, we must follow all the
rules of "aesthetic experience."
As already
noted, these eighteenth century canons are
based on an elaborate system of prior social!
historical concepts (verbal and nonverbal).
These must be learned (formally or informally); they are by no means "natural" laws.
63

17

Visions of Research in Music Education, Vol. 16 [2021], Art. 25
On the other hand, MEAE asserts that music
presents
the forms of feelinzb'"immediately"
.
via a pure perception of sounds.
2.10 Finally, MEAE's departing plea for a
tranformation of music education to "a still
undefined unity with its sister arts" Cp. 241) is
yet another way in which this philosophy
undermines its own intent to provide a
strong and secure basis for music education.
How SOl A final note on Reimer's debt to
Langer will explain the point.
Langer's theory of fine art takes the aesthetic concept of the "fine arts" one step further. In her attempt to construct a comprehensive theory, Langer (1953) argues that
:'the proper way to construct a general theory
IS by generalization
of a special one" (p. 24).
Hence Langer generalizes her symbolic
theory to all the "sister arts." The outcome of
this logic is the conclusion (repeated by
Reimer) that all fine arts are unified in a common purpose: to express forms of human
feeling (p. 231)
Unfortunately, Langer's argument fails. For
constructing a general theory from a special
one only holds if the special theory one begins with is satisfactory in itself (which is
doubtful in the case of Langer's theory), or if
all such theories turned out to be the same
regardless of their starting point. But verification of this is not possible. Thus, as Sparshott
(1963) notes, Langer's logic ought to raise serious doubts in anyone bothered by such exclusive claims of truth based upon one-sided
and unverifiable accounts (p. 43), From this
perspective, Reimer's belief that "any claim
we make for the value of music in education
can be made equally validly by every other
art" (p, 227) is problematic on three counts.
First, as I have explained already, Reimer's
claim is based on an illogical theory of the
nature and value of music. Second, it rests
on a questionable approach to developing a
general theory. Third, it prevents MEAE from
providing what it promised readers at the
outset: a "strong foundation" for explaining
why music's value is "unique" (i.e., singular,
without equal, or impossible to duplicate).
For how can music's value be unique if the
same value can be provided by many other
pursuits? Following IvlEAE'slogic, if teachers
or administrators substitute painting or
dance, or poetry for music, they are still providing students with something that MEAE
asserts has essentially the same nature and
value as music: a perceptible form expressive
of human feeling. As it turns out, then,
64
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MEAE is advancing the view that music is
neither unique nor necessary in the curriculum since any "fine art" offers the means to
improve that which MEAE most wants to improve: not musicianship, not musicality, not
artistry, but "aesthetic sensitivity" (p. 229).
According to this philosophy, as long as a
"fine art" is available in the curriculum students will have access to "forms of feeling"
the embodiment of which is the essential
function that "all art serves and fulfills in the
same manner" (p. 229).

Conclusion
Since MEAE holds that the nature of music
is limited to symbolizing the forms of feeling;
~nd since the activity of imposing general
forms on feelings does not seem to be educative in any logical sense; and since the
forms that music re-presents are neither distinguishable between feelings nor among
other nonaffective phenomena; then MEAE's
notion that music "educates" human feeling-and that music education is the education of feeling-seems
implausible.
Put directly, MEAE's adopted position on
the nature and value of music has severe
weaknesses. Its most important propositions
do not pass the test of logical scrutiny. According to MEAE's own premise, then, the
same must be said of this philosophy's explanation of the nature and value of music education.
For these reasons (and others that cannot
be given more space here), I suggest that
"music education as aesthetic education"
does not provide a secure philosophical basis
for the organization and conduct of music
education.
In conclusion, if there are good reasons for
music educators to have such a thing as a
"philosophy of music education," then perhaps it is time to begin looking for an alternative to "music education as aesthetic education." Perhaps the time has come to develop a new philosophy of music education,
not by culling from normative theories of
music-as-fine-art, or "symbol," (or whatever),
but by undertaking an independent philosophical analysis of MUSIC itself.

Endnotes
1. All page references refer to the 1989 edition of
A Philosophy of Music Education.
2. APMEdoes not include a careful analysis of
this root sense of "art" (see Reimer, 1989, pp;
65-66).
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